Future of VNSAs

POST-9/11, violent non-state actors impact the world order and intensify debate on their future, which will be shaped by governance quality and geopolitical, technological, environmental and societal trends. VNSAs try to erode state monopoly on violence, control territory, extort money, dispense ‘justice’, provide relief and perform security functions, using violence to achieve their political, ideological or economic aims. They challenge national and global security as well as governance and development, and weaken state authority and institutions, creating power vacuums.

Via the internet, VSNAs strengthen their propaganda, deface and hack official websites and attempt online radicalisation. Their use of encrypted communication platforms like Telegram, makes surveillance and tracking them difficult. They also use drones for sabotage, breaking state monopoly and accessing cheap aerial reconnaissance that aid attacks on targets. Thus states must invest in digital governance and cyber policing.

Due to the internet, their physical presence isn’t necessary for global coordination: propaganda can be spread at minimal cost, and worldwide recruitment and radicalisation carried out. Many terrorist groups prefer child soldiers — a grave human rights violation, which also poses a serious long-term threat to states. Globalisation enables them to buy drones and radio jammers, turning small groups into regional militants. The response demands joint CT cooperation. Technology has helped embed them in crowded cities, making urban warfare harder for states. It has also removed geographical barriers, allowing them to recruit, fund-raise, radicalise, coordinate and influence public views through better planning and logistics. Open-source intel such as Google Maps and satellite imagery helps them plan attacks, understand the terrain and track movement. Militaries function as centralised forces; VNSAs adapt to a decentralised structure, posing difficulties for LEAs which operate within legal frameworks, with ethical norms and geographical limits. Committed to their narrative, militants violate these. Fragmentation of terrorist groups has led to localisation, as seen in the case of IS and Al Qaeda, each with specific local aims.

They may at times have a leaderless resistance, and operate in small autonomous cells or as lone wolves. Lack of clear leadership makes detection and arrests difficult. Weak institutions in some parts of the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan give VSNAs space. In poorly governed states, they try to replace the state and expand their influence by creating their own administration, including a justice system, leading to long-term CT efforts.

VSNAs pose a long-term threat to states.

VNSAs thrive in conflict-ridden, poorly governed spaces with social fragmentation in tribal communities. They take advantage of global power rivalries and poor governance, weakening state capacity and legitimacy. Great power rivalry can fuel demand for VNSAs, leading to acquisition of arms and funds to increase their durability. Their presence exposes gaps in internal and external policies, flaws in administrative and criminal justice systems, and misinterpreted religious beliefs. They benefit from policy and legal ambiguity as they’re labelled organised criminals, terrorists and insurgents. They often employ hybrid tactics combining criminal intent and violence with ideological aims, making it difficult to distinguish between terrorism, insurgency and organised crime. Some groups in Afghanistan, Balochistan and the former tribal belts have made this part of their strategy.

Natural disasters ca­­­­u­sed by climate cha­nge can create breeding gro­unds for VSNAs who ex­­ploit the resulting power vacuum to build narratives, rec­ruit and radica­lise the younger generations through disinforma­­t-ion. Prolonged civil wars benefit them, hence they resist peace settle­­ments.

Technology links VNSAs with diaspora networks and enables fund appeals. Cryptocurrency and online fundraising links them with sympathisers, easing money transfer across borders. Anonymous donations and transfers undermines conventional CT financing efforts. To cover operational costs, VNSAs generate money by exploiting natural resources, leading to environmental degradation, drug trafficking and extortion.

Terrorism has resurged in areas bordering Afghanistan. Despite earlier kinetic gains, militant factions have resurfaced with new strategies, alliances and operational capacity. States must combine hard power, governance reform, technological solutions and community engagement. VNSAs won’t go away but their forms, tactics and motivations will change. Tech innovations, social change, rights movements, effective local governance and better community ties will strengthen the modern state and reduce the space for VNSAs.

The writer is the author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.

X: @alibabakhel

Published in Dawn, March 17th, 2026

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