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THE quagmire of Middle East wars that has badly hurt all US presidents since Richard Nixon is now ensnaring a clueless Donald Trump. As plucky Iran alone foils American and Israelis might and war costs rise, the illegality and practical futility of their war bites them hard.
The US says it’s acting pre-emptively under UN self-defence laws, given Iran’s nuclear threat. But UN laws allow pre-emption against attacks imminent in the short run — not distant threats. Iran’s unproven nuclear heft or intent to use it failed the imminence test. Israel says such laws cover its attacks on militants in other states too. But, as the verdicts of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) say, they apply clearly to attacks by states, not militants as the two differ.
State attacks come from across borders, mainly use state resources and are controlled by a state. So, culpability is clear and one-sided and there is a legal right to attack it until the UN is informed, as required, and acts. But attacks often come from one’s own soil and involve citizens who use local resources and aid from foreign-based groups whom the other state may not control. Both states fail to evict the terrorists. An attack by one state on another may go on for days. So, self-defence attacks are needed to end it. Many attacks, including suicide attacks, end even before the host state can act, and there may be long gaps before the next one. So, the one-sided culpability of a state for unprovoked attacks is absent.
The ICJ in Congo’s 2005 case against Uganda rejected the latter’s plea that it attacked the former country legally in self-defence against terrorists based there. It gave strict criteria for UN self-defence laws to apply in such cases: proven control of a state on terrorists (like Serbia’s in 1992), the intensity of their attacks, and the immediacy, proportionality and necessity of one’s counter-attacks on the other state. Such high bars aim to limit more ruinous state wars. State air and artillery responses to smaller attacks may be disproportionate and delayed and the role of the other state and the necessity of one’s own response hard to prove if terrorists don’t cross borders for every attack but largely operate locally.
If illegality was clear from day one, futility is clear by now.
If illegality was clear from day one, futility is clear by now. Unlike Gaza, ‘USrael’ can only fight Iran for a few weeks given its ability to hit them and their allies hard and as war in this region badly affects the global economy. While their last war on Iran was mainly on its nuclear sites, the aim now is weakening it overall and changing its regime directly or via rebels/ protests. Two weeks later, this aim seems surreal. So, there is much pressure on the US to end the war from multiple transmission routes — the Gulf and Western allies, Democrats, peace groups, media and above all the economic fallout on US voters and markets.
By appointing the late Ayatollah Khamenei’s son as the new Supreme Leader, Iran has clearly signalled hard-line regime continuity. In fact, it is the two aggressors that may actually suffer regime change. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, may lose the next elections and Trump’s party the mid-term ones as domestic foes mock their failed aims. One opposes Iran’s autocratic misrule but opposes much more the war on it by global gangster states like ‘USrael’.
The war will affect others too. The Gulf states may review their US alliances though they lack viable alternatives.
For us, the war will impact three key economic metrics — inflation, foreign reserves and growth — and three key aspects of foreign policy. Firstly, its unwise to be chummy with a martial egoistic like Trump and back him for a Nobel Peace Prize. We must not be too chummy nor needlessly hostile to a global warlord like the US. Secondly, we must openly discuss and fine-tune the Saudi pact which our officials have referred to once the Saudis were hit. Our dilemma is that the Saudis are our closest ally but fighting bordering Iran while global tyrants like ‘USrael’ attack it and while we fight the Afghan Taliban as well is dicey. Gulf states have seen a furious blowback for having US bases on their soil, without their even fighting Iran directly.
Thirdly, given the complex legal and utility issues, we’re rightly backing China’s efforts to end our conflict with the Afghan Taliban. The best way to deal with the TTP is to secure our own border and soil against it without harming the locals. The best way to deal with the Afghan Taliban is not war or talks but applying material pressure on them — by us and other states upset with them — without harming the locals.
The writer has a PhD degree in political economy from the University of California, Berkeley, and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experience across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, March 17th, 2026
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